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LAw-Thornhill

RE-

EXAMINED-In the spring of 1940, the Isle of Thornhill1 emerged from
the watery depths and assumed a position in the Sea of American Constitutional Law. The discoverors of this Isle indicated their success was
largely due to certain revelations made known three years· before by
another highly distinguished explorer. 2 - The pronouncement in 1940 of
the Isle's existence excited great furor and debate among the professional
geographers as to its substance and future utility. 3 In the early days of
its discovery, Thornhill's area and coastline were not precisely or
clearly charted, and only through several subsequent voyages have these
important facts become clarified. The most recent expeditions,4 whose
findings were announced on May 8, 1950, have led some geographers
to assert that few, if any, traces of Thornhill remain to break the waves
rolling over the position it formerly occupied. 5 It is not the pU!JJOSe of
this article to rejoice or lament the storming waves which have crumbled
and eaten away the lands of Thornhill, but rather to discover practically
what traces remain and to what extent Thornhill may be of use to future
voyageurs.
1 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940), commented on in 29
MICH. L. REv. 110 (1940).
2 Justice Brandeis, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct.
857 (1937). An interesting debate has arisen as to whether Justice Brandeis was properly
understood. It is apparently Justice Frankfurter's present opinion that Justice Brandeis had
no intention of stating that peaceful picketing was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See footnotes 2 and 3 in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousing
& Helpers Union, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773- (1950). It is difficult
to reconcile Justice Frankfurter's present view with his statements in Cafeteria Employees
Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126 (1943).
3 Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 HAnv. L. REv. 513 (1943); Teller, "Picketing and
Free Speech: A Reply," 56 HAnv. L. REv. 532 (1943); Jaffe, "In Defense of the Supreme
Court's Picketing Doctrine," 41 MxcH. L. REv. 1037 (1943).
4 Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262 v. Gazzara, 339 U.S.
532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousing & Helpers Union, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950); Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950).
5 Gregory, "Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Employer
Conduct," 49 MICH. L. REv. 191 (1950).
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The decision in Thornhill 11. Alabama possessed such sweeping
breadth as to be subject to divergent and conflicting interpretations,
each of which found a measure of support in the Court's opinion. An
Alabama statute forbidding all peaceful picketing "without a just cause
or legal excuse" 6 was there declared unconstitutional as an abridgement
of free discussion guaranteed by the Constitution; the theory of the
Court equated peaceful picketing with freedom of speech. The Swing
case7 quickly followed. A union of beauty workers had picketed the
plaintiff's beauty parlor for organizational purposes. The Illinois court
enjoined the picketing on the ground that no proximate relationship of
employer-employee existed between the picketers and the picketed.
The United States Supreme Court ruled: "A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by
drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and
workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him." 8 It is essential to note that the Court did not deny to
the states the power to draw any circle that would exclude workingmen
from peacefully exercising the right of free communication. Thus, the
rationale of the Swing case made possible a future affirmation of a state's
power to enjoin peaceful picketing where the circle was not drawn "so
small."9
The interjection of violence into the process of picketing presented
to the Supreme Court a quite different situation. In Hotel & Restaurant
Employees International Alliance, Local 122 11. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,1° the Court held that a state may enjoin violence
taking place on the picket line, as manifestly violence does not constitute an expression of free speech. In Milk Wagon Drivers Union of
Chicago, Local 75311. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 11 the Court went one
step farther and permitted the enjoining of both violence and peaceful
picketing when "the momentum of fear generated by past violence
would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful."12 Neither of these cases represented any qualification of Thornhill, provided the factual hypothesis of the survival of fear is assumed
for the Meadowmoor decision.
Alabama State Code of 1923, §3448.
Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568 (1941).
BJd. at 326.
9 Such an affirmation is exemplified by Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local
No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807 (1942).
10 315 U.S. 437, 62 S.Ct. 706 (1942).
11 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941).
12 Id. at 294.
6

7 American
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Thornhill was further tested in the W ohl13 and Angelos14 cases. In
each of these cases, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
right to picket as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was not dependent upon the existence of a "labor dispute" as defined by state law.
This delineation of the scope of Thornhill was only partially revealing,
for no indication was given as to whether the constitutionally protected
privilege of peaceful picketing was restricted by some broader definition of "labor dispute" than chosen by the state courts in those cases.15
However, viewing the developments of the past years from the vantage
point of 1950, Thornhill reached the summit of its powers in the Wohl
case. For those who had enthusiastically acclaimed a broad application
of Thornhill, the succeeding years and developments contained only
sorrow and disillusionment.
In Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe,1 6 the Court discovered the proper vehicle to express more fully
what it had hinted at in Wohl as a possible restriction on peaceful picketing. Ritter had contracted with Plaster for construction of a home;
Plaster hired nonunion labor. A union of carpenters picketed a cafe
owned by Ritter to induce him to require Plaster to hire union labor.
The cafe business suffered a sixty percent decline in patronage. The
United States Supreme Court upheld an injunction issued by a court
of Texas against such peaceful picketing on the grounds that the restaurant business of Ritter was "wholly outside the economic context of
the real dispute" ;17 there was no "interdependence of economic interest
of all engaged in the same industry."18 The State of Texas had drawn
a proper circle in which to confine the activity of peaceful picketing
without infringing constitutional rights. In Wohl, there were beauty
workers picketing a beauty parlor; in Ritter, there were carpenters picketing a restaurant. The circle drawn by Texas was calculated on an
economic dimension which permitted peaceful picketing within the
circumference of each industry only.
13 Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942).
14 Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126
(1943).
15 Jndeed, it has never been clarified as to whether peaceful picketing must be an incident to the labor-management scene to fall within the range of Thornhill, or whether picketing for such purposes as lower prices or rents is similarly protected. See, !'Non-Labor Picketing and Thornhill," 41 Cot. L. R.Ev. 89 (1941); 98 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 545 (1950).
1a 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807 (1942).
17Jd. at 726.
1s Id. at 727.
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The decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.19 cut completely across this industry-measured circle of protected peaceful picketing with the introduction of the unlawful purpose doctrine. In this
case, the union was seeking to unionize peddlers of ice and therefore
requested of Empire, a wholesaler in ice, not to sell to nonunion peddlers. When Empire refused, it was picketed. Over eighty percent of
Empire's peddlers were union men, so they stopped deliveries to and
from Empire. The United States Supreme Court held that such peaceful picketing was enjoinable by the state on the theory that "all of appellants', activities . . . constituted a single and integrated course of
conduct, which was in violation of Missouri's valid law. In this situation, the injunction did no more than enjoin an offense against Missouri law, a felony." 20 Other portions of the Court's opinion appeared
to state that the peaceful picketing, even though not in itself a violation of Missouri's anti-restraint of trade law, was nevertheless enjoinable because it sought to induce Empire to violate this law. In any case,
two factors in Giboney should be noted: (1) The State of Missouri had
declared the illegality of the trade practices through its legislature, and
(2) Empire could not accede to the union's.demands without violating ·
Missouri law. Several writers, in commenting on Giboney, reasoned
that picketing for a purpose unlawful at common law, as distinguished
from statutory law, would not be enjoinable.21 The three decisions of
May 8, 1950, have prov(:!d their predictions inaccurate.
The case of Gazzam v. Building Service Employees International
Union 26222 will be considered first, for it represents only a moderate
extension of the Giboney rationale. Each of the other two cases, in the
order treated, constitutes a further step toward narrowing Thornhill' s
operative scope. In Gazzam, the union· was seeking to organize the
employees in plaintiff's hotel. The employees expressly informed the
plaintiff they did not wish to join the union. Thereafter, when the
plaintiff refused to sign a contract with the union containing either a
closed or union shop provision, the union placed pickets about the
hotel. The Washington court enjoined the picketing on the grounds
that under state statute and the common law of the state, it was unlawful for an employer to coerce or compel his employees to join a
union. Thus, under Giboney theory, picketing to induce an employer
to violate state lm:i.1 is enjoinable. The United States Supreme Court,
10 336 U.S. 490,
2 0 Id. at 498.

69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).

2162 !Lmv. L. R:Ev. 1402 (1949); 44 ILL. L. REv. 714 (1949).
2 2 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950).
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in affirming the state court's decision, stated, "An adequate basis for the
instant decree is the unlawful objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the employer of the employees' selection of a bargaining representative."23 It was thereby clarified that picketing by itself did not
have to violate some law of the state; it was sufficient if the picketing
sought to induce the employer to commit an illegal act. Gazzam further
demonstrated that the statute on which the state relies to establish the
illegality of the employer's act need not possess criminal sanctions for
violations thereof. The statute in Gazzam which forbade the employer
to interfere with his employees' selection of a bargaining representative
was merely a statement of policy in the state labor disputes act. In a
fairly practical sense, the employer was free to accede to the union's
demands without fear of legal repercussions.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousing & Helpers' Union, Local 309 v. Hanke, 24 the plaintiff, a partnership which dealt in auto repair work and the sale of used cars, had no
employees. The local automobile salesmen's union made an agreement
with the Independent Automobile Dealers' Association to the effect that
showrooms and lots would be closed after 6:00 P.M. on week days and
entirely closed on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. The plaintiff, not
a member of this association, was requested to respect the scheduled
working hours, but declined. A single picket was placed at plaintiff's
business location and the business declined s-qbstantially. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of an injunction restraining such picketing on the authority of the Gazzam case. Gazzam's
similarity is highly questionable. There the employer could not accede
to the union's demand without violating state law, admittedly only
hortatory. In Hanke, the employer possessed complete legal freedom
to grant the union's requests. Each case spoke of "unlawful coercion,"
but this term referred to quite different acts in each case. In Gazzam,
the unlawful coercion was the employer compelling his employees to
join a union. In Hanke, the unlawful coercion was the peaceful picketing itself, which had been elevated to a constitutional right by Thornhill. The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the issuance of
the injunction, found the question to be of "The power of the State to
declare a policy in favor of self-employers and to make conduct restrictive of self-employment unlawful. ..."25 The Court's conclusion was,
"... we cannot conclude that Washington, in holding the picketing in
23 Id. at 539.
24
25

339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950).
Id. at 480.

1951]

COMMENTS

1053

these cases to be for an unlawful object, has struck a balance so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people that it must be found an
unconstitutional choice."26 The enunciation of this test in the "free
speech" area is surprising considering the usual tests applied by the
Court when a state law is challenged as violative of First Amendment
rights. The negative form (so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a
free people) is more consistent with tests of the constitutionality of the
exercise of state power in the economic area.
The case of Hughes 11. Superior Court2 1 should demonstrate beyond any doubt the resolute intention of the United States Supreme
Court to withdraw itself as an active force from the process of shaping
the permissible scope of peaceful picketing. A nontrade organization
of Negroes picketed certain stores urging the owners to hire Negro
clerks in proportion to Negro patronage. These stores, located in Negro
districts, depended greatly for their success on customers of the Negro
race. The California Supreme Court upheld the issuance of an injunction restraining picketing by drawing an astonishing analogy to a prior
California decision which had forbidden the conjunction of a closed
union with a closed shop. 28 The picketing Negroes were informed by
the California court that discrimination in favor of the Negro race was
an unlawful purpose in spite of the fact that the discrimination by the
store owners against the Negro race, while to be deplored: was nevertheless not forbidden by state law. It should be noted that Hughes was
not a repetition of the Hanke case. In Hanke, the Washington court
sought to protect the freedom of a self-employed person to join or not
join a union. If that person chose freely to join, no harm was done for
he had then exercised the very choice which the state had sought to
protect. However, the purpose of the California court in Hughes was
to discourage racial discrimination. Where an employer practices with
legal impunity a steady, deliberate scheme of discrimination against the
employment of Negroes, by what standard of justice could a court term
unlawful the objective of reducing the scope of such discrimination to
a proportion equal to the racial patronage of the store? Here was one
of the strongest cases possible for the United States Supreme Court to
rule that the state had "struck a balance so inconsistent with rooted
traditions of a free people" that peaceful picketing under such circum2s Id.

at 478-79.
339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950).
28 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944). For an
excellent refutation of the "analogy," see the dissenting opinion of Justice Carter in Hughes
v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. (2d) 850, 198 P. (2d) 885 (1948).
21
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stances could not be enjoined. If this test possessed any real vitality
or substance, Hughes presented an excellent opportunity for its expression. Instead, the Court simply stated, "If ... a state chooses to enjoin
picketing to secure submission to a demand for employment proportional to the racial origin of the then customers of a business, it need
not forbid the employer to adopt such a quota system of his own free

wiil."29
The conclusion seems inevitable that Thornhill has been relegated
to the single ground of denying to the states the power to ban all peaceful picketing. Through use of the unlawful purpose formula, the substance of the Wohl and Swing cases has been overruled. The state
courts are now advised as to the ·existence of certain clear channels
through which they may reach their destination of regulation of peaceful picketing. These channels have been created to neutralize the
Thornhill attempt to thrust peaceful picketing, by nature possessed of
both speech and nop.speech characteristics, into the "free speech" concept. It is now apparent that picketing was conceptually incapable of
this characterization. Hence, peaceful picketing, as interpreted by the
Court, has undergone a process of bewildering vacillation between the
clearly defined concepts of free speech and economic con8.ict. Some
writers have sought to dissect peaceful picketing into "signal" and
"publicity" categories,30 but the Hughes case has apparently repudiated
this distinction, for there the pickets lacked any trade union allies who
would, upon signal, align themselves against the employer. The states
are now free for all practical purposes to regulate peaceful picketing
without fear of con8.ict with Thornhill.

Rex Eames, S. Ed.

20 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S.
30 98 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 545 (1950);

460 at 468, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950).
Cox, Report of Labor Relations Law Section,
Committee on State Legislation, American Bar Association 11 (1949). Professor Charles
0. Gregory disapproves of this distinction. See 49 MICH. L. REv. 191 (1950).

